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ACTION BROUGHT BY A PRIVATE PERSON EVEN THOUGH SHE IS
A PARTY IN A WIDELY PUBLICIZED DIVORCE PROCEEDING-

Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958 (1976).
Russell A. Firestone Jr., "the scion of one of America's wealthier
industrial families," was granted a divorce from his wife, Mary Alice
Sullivan Firestone, in 1967.1 The divorce was a result of Mr. Firestone's counterclaim to an action for separate maintenance which had
been initiated by his wife. 2 In his counterclaim Mr. Firestone alleged
"extreme cruelty and adultery" on the part of his wife,
and the trial
3
his
divorce.
granted
his
favor,
"
in
equities'
"
'the
finding
court,
4
On the basis of information gathered from several sources,
1 Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958, 963 (1976); see Firestone v. Firestone, No.
64 C 2790 C (Fla. Cir. Ct., Dec. 15, 1967).
2 Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958, 963 (1976).
3 Id. at 958, 963-64.
4 Id. at 964. The sources from which the item was gathered were a wire service report, a New York newspaper story, a "stringer" assigned to the Palm Beach area, and
Time's Miami bureau chief. Id. The final judgment of divorce, however, stated in part:
"This cause came on for final hearing before the court upon the plaintiff
wife's second amended complaint for separate maintenance (alimony unconnected with the causes of divorce), the defendant husband's answer and counterclaim for divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery ....

"According to certain testimony in behalf of the defendant, extramarital escapades of the plaintiff were bizarre and of an amatory nature which would
have made Dr. Freud's hair curl. Other testimony, in plaintiff's behalf, would
indicate that defendant was guilty of bounding from one bedpartner to another
with the erotic zest of a satyr. The court is inclined to discount much of this
testimony as unreliable. Nevertheless, it is the conclusion and finding of the
court that neither party is domesticated ....
"The premises considered, it is thereupon
"ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
"1. That the equities in this cause are with the defendant; that defendant's
counterclaim for divorce be and the same is hereby granted .... "
Id. at 963-64 (quoting from Firestone v. Firestone, No. 64 C 2790 C (Fla. Cir. Ct., Dec.
15, 1967)).
The final judgment was affirmed by the Florida supreme court although "lack of
domestication"-upon which the trial court had based its grant of divorce-was not a
valid ground for divorce in Florida. The supreme court, however, found adequate evidence in the record to support the judgment on grounds of extreme cruelty. Firestone v.
Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223, 225 (Fla. 1972), aff'g in part Firestone v. Firestone, 249 So.
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Time, Inc. published a report in Time magazine stating that the
divorce had been granted " 'on grounds of extreme cruelty and
adultery.' "5 Mary Alice Firestone, through her attorneys, demanded a
retraction from Time, Inc., alleging that the report "was 'false, malicous and defamatory.' "6 When Time refused her request, Mrs. Firestone instituted a libel suit in Florida circuit court. 7 On Time's motion, the trial court granted summary judgment. This was reversed on
appeal, however, and a trial was had on the merits. 8 The jury found
in favor of Mrs. Firestone and awarded her $100,000 in compensatory
damages, which judgment was ultimately affirmed by the Florida
supreme court. 9 On petition by Time, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 10
In Time, Inc. v. Firestone" the Court held that Mary Alice
Firestone did not have to prove actual malice on the part of Time in
the publication of the defamatory report because she "was not a 'public figure.' "12 The Court also determined that the fact that Time was
reporting on a judicial proceeding did not automatically invoke the

2d 719 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971). For a list of valid grounds on which divorce may be
granted in Florida see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.041 (1969), amending FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 65.04 (1965) (the Florida divorce statute in effect at the time of the Firestone divorce).
5 Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958, 964 (1976). The complete Milestones item
read:
"DIVORCED. By Russell A. Firestone Jr., 41, heir to the tire fortune: Mary
Alice Sullivan Firestone, 32, his third wife; a onetime Palm Beach schoolteacher; on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery; after six years of marriage,
one son; in West Palm Beach, Fla. The 17-month intermittent trial produced
enough testimony of extramarital adventures on both sides, said the judge, 'to
make Dr. Freud's hair curl.'"
Id.
, Id. Notice to the publisher of an allegedly defamatory falsehood is required under
Florida law before a defamation proceeding can be instituted. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 770.01 (1963).
7 Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958, 964 (1976).
8 Firestone v. Time, Inc., 231 So. 2d 862, 863-65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970). The
appellate court reversed because such "subjective elements [as] willfulness, intent,
maliciousness or good faith" would necessarily be involved in a determination of liability for an alleged defamatory falsehood. Thus, a jury had to be given the opportunity to
hear the evidence and make an independent judgment. Id. at 865.
9
See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958, 964 (1976); Firestone v. Time, Inc.,
305 So. 2d 172, 178 (Fla. 1974), rev'g 279 So. 2d 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 753 (Fla. 1972), rev'g 254 So. 2d 386, 390 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1971), rev'g Firestone v. Time, Inc., No. 68 C 977 (Fla. Cir. Ct., July 16,
1970).
10 Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 421 U.S. 909 (1975).
1 96 S. Ct. 958 (1976).
12Id. at 965-66. For a discussion of the actual-malice standard to be applied in
defamation actions see note 21 infra and accompanying text.

19761

NOTES

actual-malice standard 3 --an issue not treated in this Note. Finding
no evidence in the record to establish clearly that there had been a
finding of fault on the part of Time,' 4 the Court, relying on its recent
statement of defamation law which required such a showing of fault
before liability could attach to media publishers of libelous state5
ments, vacated the judgment and remanded for this determination.1
The issue of a newspaper's responsibility under state libel laws
was first before the Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.' 6 In
that case The New York Times had published an advertisement, sponsored by a group of civil rights advocates, which contained a number
of factual inaccuracies. 1 7 Sullivan, an elected city official, sued the
Times under Alabama libel law and recovered a judgment of
$500,000.18 On certiorari, the Supreme Court considered the extent
13 96 S. Ct. at 966-67. For a discussion of the basis for this argument see Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Note, Right of Privacy Versus Freedom of the Press-The Press Cannot Be Restrained from Reporting Facts Contained in
Official Court Records, 24 EMORY L.J. 1205 (1975).
1496 S. Ct. at 969-70; see also id. at 971 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring). Although the
Florida supreme court had stated that Time's report of the Firestone divorce was "clear
and convincing evidence of . . . negligence" and had characterized Time's reportorial
procedures in this instance as "a flagrant example of 'journalistic negligence,' " Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172, 178 (Fla. 1974), the Supreme Court did not consider
this to be an adequate finding of fault. 96 S. Ct. at 969-70.
is 96 S. Ct. at 970.

16 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).

17 Id. at 256-59.
I Id. at 256. Under the Alabama law in effect at the time, it was "sufficient to state,
generally, that the defamatory matter was published or spoken of the plaintiff," in order
to recover damages. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 910 (1960). The Alabama supreme court in this
case held that the statements in the advertisement were "libelous per se," and defined
this term to mean statements that
tend to injure a person libeled by them in his reputation, profession, trade or
business, or charge him with an indictable offense, or tend . . . to bring the
individual into public contempt ....
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 673, 144 So. 2d 25, 37 (1962). If tle
defamatory falsehoods were libelous per se, no proof of actual injury was required. Id.
at 685, 144 So. 2d at 49 (quoting from Johnson Publishing Co. v. Davis, 271 Ala. 474,
487, 124 So. 2d 441, 450 (1960)).
According to Dean Prosser, libelous statements may be actionable on their facethat is, libelous per se-if they fall into four general categories: imputation of a crime,
imputation of a loathesome disease, imputation of unchastity to a woman, or if the
statement relates to a matter that affects the plaintiff in his employment. W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 754-60 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER].

If the allegedly defamatory statement is not libelous on its face, damages may still
be recovered, provided that actual injury can be shown to have resulted from the publication. This type of defamation was referred to by Dean Prosser as libel per quod.
Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REV. 839, 839-40, 849 (1960). This terminology and
Dean Prosser's distinction between libel per se and libel per quod were not universally
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to which the first amendment insulated the press from the impact of
state libel law in actions brought by public officials. 19 The Court held
that public officials could not recover damages for defamatory
falsehoods 20 printed about their public conduct, absent a showing
that these statements had been published "with 'actual malice'-that
is, with knowledge that [they were] false or with reckless disregard"
as to whether or not they were false. 2 1 The controlling factor in the
accepted, however. Compare Prosser, More Libel Per Quod, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1629
(1966), and Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REV. 839 (1960), with Eldredge, Variations on Libel Per Quod, 25 VAND. L. REV. 79 (1972), and Eldredge, The Spurious Rule
of Libel Per Quod, 79 HARV. L. REV. 733 (1966).
The development of American defamation law from its English common law roots is
the subject of excellent treaiment by Lovell, The "Reception" of Defamation By the
Common Law, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1962), and Veeder, The History and Theory of
the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 546 (1903), 4 COLUM. L. REV. 33 (1904).
What ultimately developed from this centuries-long evolutionary process was a tort that
imposed strict liability on publishers of defamatory falsehoods in the absence of any
"privilege." Jones v. E. Hulton & Co. [1909] K.B. 444, 454-57, aff'd, [1910] A.C. 20, 26.
For a discussion of this theory of strict liability see PROSSER, supra, § 113, at 772-74.
Most states, including Alabama, recognized a qualified privilege in their libel laws
which was referred to as "fair comment." This was a privilege to comment publicly on
the "conduct and qualifications of public officers and public employees." Id. § 118, at
819 (footnotes omitted). This privilege did not, however, protect publishers of false
statements. Id. § 118, at 819-20. Under this prevailing philosophy, the publisher was
held to strict liability for publication of a defamatory falsehood, which liability was limited only to the extent "that the defamatory meaning and the reference to the plaintiff
• . .be reasonably conveyed to and understood by others." Id. § 113, at 773 (footnote
omitted). For a compilation of states adhering to this majority rule see Noel, Defamation
of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 875, 896 n.102 (1949). For a
discussion of the minority position which included false statements in the fair comment
privilege see Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 715-44, 98 P. 281, 282-92 (1908);
PROSSER, supra, § 118, at 820; Noel, supra at 896-97 & n.103. See also note 21 infra.
19376 U.S. at 256.
20Dean Prosser has defined defamation as
that which tends to injure "reputation" in the popular sense; to diminish the
esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him.
PROSSER supra note 18, § 111, at 739 (footnote omitted).
A defamatory statement has also been defined as "one which tends to hold the
plaintiff up to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to cause him to be shunned or avoided."
Id. (footnote omitted). Dean Prosser expressed the opinion that this definition may have
dated back to 1840. Id. n.17; see Parmiter v. Coupland, 6 M. & W. 105, 108, 151 Eng.
Rep. 340, 342 (1840).
21 376 U.S. at 279-80. In applying an "actual malice" standard to the facts of this
case, the Court ostensibly adopted the "substantial, and vigorous, minority view that
even false statements of fact were privileged" and that strict liability could not attach to
publishers of such statements provided that they were published "for the public benefit
with an honest belief in their truth." PROSSER, supra note 18, § 118, at 820 (footnote
omitted) & n.9.
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Court's decision was the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open."-2 2 Since erroneous statements are an inevitable byIn adopting this minority position, Justice Brennan "quoted with approval" an opinion by Justice Burch of the Kansas supreme court. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A
Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191, 215.
This opinion by Justice Burch in Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908),
has been referred to by Professor Kalven as perhaps "the most elaborate, careful, extended act of balancing" of the two competing interests involved in defamation law: the
societal necessity for free access to information and the interest of the states in protecting the reputations of their citizens. Kalven, supra at 215. Professor Kalven suggests that
the Times decision provided an opportunity for the Court to set out a balancing test for
constitutional adjudication of defamation suits, but that there is no discussion of any
such test in the opinion. See id.at 215-16.
The Court's use of the term "actual malice" has led to some confusion. In Times,
Justice Brennan attempted to define the term by equating it with "reckless disregard."
376 U.S. at 279-80. This seems an attempt to differentiate the Times Court's meaning of
actual malice and the common law usage of the term. Common law actual malice has
been defined as "bad or corrupt motive, personal spite, ill will, or a desire to injure."
Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 54 TEXAS L. REV. 199, 203 (1976). At least one other commentator has indicated
that the Court itself may have been "confused and thought it was adopting the common
law definition." Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1370 n.91 (1975).
Professor Eaton also discusses the confusion among lower courts resulting from the
Times Court's use of "actual malice" and notes the Court's studious avoidance of continuing use of the term. See id. at 1370-75 & n.97.
The Court itself was forced to elucidate its original definition of actual malice. In
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), the Court stated that the actual-malice test
required a "high degree of awareness of [the] probable falsity" of the statements on the
part of the publisher. Id. at 74. In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), the
Court elaborated on the definition by pointing out
that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man
would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with
such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.
Id. at 731. For a discussion of the application of this definition to selected activities see
generally Comment, Calculated Misstatements of Fact Not Protected by First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press, 1969 UTAH L. REV. 118.
22 376 U.S. at 270. The Times Court examined at length the societal and political
reasons underlying passage of the first amendment. Justice Brennan pointed out that the
debate surrounding the passage of the Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596, exemplified the deep antipathy of the citizenry toward attempts to stifle freedom of discussion and debate. The Court also took note of the significant fact that this statute was the
first and only attempt by the federal government to impose restraints on the freedom of
speech and press. See 376 U.S. at 273-77. Although this highly unpopular act was never
before the Court in a test of its constitutionality, there are several indications that it was
an invalid restraint on the freedoms of speech and press guaranteed by the first
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product of this vigorous public debate, the Court found that, if compelled by state libel laws to guarantee the accuracy of the material
they print, publishers would be forced to resort to self-censorship,
and first amendment values would suffer from a lack of " 'breathing
space.' -23 The Court, however, was careful to limit the applicability
of the actual-malice standard to public officials only, specifically re24
serving the question as to possible extension of the rule.
amendment. See, e.g., Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 27-28 (1941);
2 T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 900 (8th ed. W. Carrington 1927); W. 0.
DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 47 (1958).

The Times Court acknowledged that the first amendment applies specifically to the
federal government, but Justice Brennan pointed out that passage of the fourteenth
amendment had made the provisions of the first amendment applicable to the states.
The Court noted a series of cases in which it had held that states could not restrict first
amendment rights through overbroad criminal statutes and made the statement that
"[w]hat a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is
likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel." 376 U.S. at 277 (footnote omitted);
see T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 521 (1970) [hereinafter

cited as

EMERSON].

Although the Times Court had ostensibly based its rationale for enunciating the
new constitutional rule requiring "actual malice" on Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan.
711, 98 P. 281 (1908), there is in fact an important discrepancy between the standards
used in the two cases. Coleman permitted insulation for the publisher if he could establish that he believed in the truth of the statements printed. Id. at 728-29, 98 P. at 287.
The standard set out in Times, however, did not take into consideration the "good faith"
of the publisher as an affirmative defense. Rather, the Times Court grounded its
privilege on the requirement that the defamation plaintiff meet the burden of proving
actual malice on the part of the publisher. In this shifting of the burden of persuasion,
the Times Court was not adopting the so-called minority position but essentially was
establishing a completely new standard for measuring a new constitutional privilege.
23 376 U.S. at 271-72 (quoting from NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
24 In Times, Justice Brennan wrote:
We have no occasion here to determine how far down into the lower ranks of
government employees the "public official" designation would extend for purposes of this rule, or otherwise to specify categories of persons who would or
would not be included.. .. Nor need we here determine the boundaries of the
"official conduct" concept.
376 U.S. at 283 n.23 (citation omitted). The Court was later confronted with a series of
cases wherein the "public official" designation required clearer explication. In Ocala
Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 299 (1971), Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401
U.S. 265, 271 (1971), and St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 728, 730 (1968), the
Court extended the "public official" term to include candidates for public office. In
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), the Court rejected the contention that public
official status was to be determined by reference to state law and held that the former
operator of a county-owned recreation area could fall under the New York Times
standard. Id. at 77, 84-86. In the Court's opinion, public official status should be accorded
at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who
have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control
over the conduct of governmental affairs.
Id. at 85 (footnote omitted).
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This extension took place three years later in the consolidated
cases of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker.25 Butts was a libel suit emanating from a story published in the
Saturday Evening Post in which Wallace Butts, athletic director at
the University of Georgia, had been depicted as having sabotaged
a football game by providing the opposing team's coach with
Georgia's game plan. 2 6 In Walker, a retired army general and noted
opponent of federal intervention in desegregation matters was erroneously reported to have led a group of people in an attack against
federal marshals who were enforcing the court-ordered integration of
the University of Mississippi. 27 Since neither Butts nor Walker was

a public official, the actual-malice standard, at least as applied under
New York Times, could not be imposed in their libel suits. 2 8 A majority of the Court, in separate opinions, extended the constitutional
rule set out in Times to include published defamatory statements
29
concerning persons who were "public figures."
In his opinion Justice Harlan took note of the first amendment
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press, pointing out that
they provide the means by which individuals may make their
thoughts public and society can engage in general debate on "matters
of public interest." 30 Since these essential rights are protected by the
In reaching its decision in Rosenblatt, the Court recognized the existence of a "tension between" state interests in protecting its citizens from libel "and the values nurtured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 86. The Court noted, however,
that the impetus of the Times decision was "that when interests in public discussion are
particularly strong . . . the Constitution limits the protections afforded by the law of
defamation." Id. (emphasis added).
25 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
26
27

Id. at 135-37.
Id. at 140.

28 Walker had retired from the Army and was a private citizen. Id. Although Butts
held the position of athletic director at a state university, he was directly employed by
the Georgia Athletic Association, a private corporation. Id. at 135. The independence of
this Association had been established in Allen v. Regents of the University Sys. of
Georgia, 304 U.S. 439, 451 (1938).
29 388 U.S. at 164, 170, 172. The extension of the Times doctrine as displayed in
Butts was not unexpected. Various commentators had viewed the Times decision as
merely the starting point for constitutional protection of the press in defamation actions.
See, e.g., Kalven, supra note 21, at 221; 44 B.U.L. REV. 563, 568 (1964); 38 S. CAL. L.
REV. 349, 354 (1965); 113 U. PA. L. REV. 284, 287 (1964); cf. Note, The Constitutional Law of Defamation and Privacy: Butts and Walker, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 649, 652
(1968) (New York Times Court apparently adopted philosophy of Dr. Alexander Meiklejohn, discussed at note 52 infra, which is issue-oriented, rather than concerned with a
person's status).
30 388 U.S. at 149. Justice Harlan expressed the view that the right to make one's
opinions public was one of the " 'unalienable' " rights upon which the Declaration of
Independence was based. Id.
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first amendment, any restrictions, such as libel laws, which are
placed upon the free exercise of these rights must not contradict the
fundamental purposes underlying the amendment. 3 ' Therefore, Justice Harlan found that basing a constitutional privilege for the press
on the distinction between public officials and private individuals was
irrational because of the existence in society of" 'private citizens who
seek to lead in the determination of . . . policy.' "32 There would,
then, seem to be some requirement for first amendment protection
for publishers of defamatory statements concerning these "public figures.
In his attempt to define the term "public figure," Justice Harlan
posited that one was a public figure merely because he happened to
hold a particular position, or that one could become a public figure
by "thrusting" oneself into the midst of "an important public controversy."3 3 In either case, the public figure-like the public official-enjoys some "continuing public interest and ...

sufficient

access" to news media to counteract the damaging effects of a defamatory falsehood. 3 4 On the other hand, Justice Harlan would not
have extended the actual-malice test automatically to public figures.
Instead, he would have permitted recovery by such plaintiffs merely
on a showing of gross negligence on the part of the publisher in pub35
lishing the defamatory statement.
31 See id. at 150. Under Justice Harlan's view, these limitations must not "affect 'the
impartial distribution of news' and ideas," place "a special burden on the press," or lay
publishers open to "physical or economic retribution solely because of what they
choose to think and publish." Id. at 151 (citations omitted). See also Kalven, The
Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 SuF. CT.
REV. 267, 279.
32 388 U.S. at 147-48 (quoting from Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing
Co., 362
F.2d 188, 196 (8th Cir. 1966)).
33 388 U.S. at 155. Butts, according to Justice Harlan, might have fallen into the first
category: He "may have attained that status [of a public figure] by position alone." Id.
Walker, on the other hand, fell into the second group; he became a public figure "by
his purposeful activity amounting to a thrusting of his personality into the 'vortex' of an
important public controversy." Id. The "purposeful activity" criterion had been anticipated by the Court in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 n.12 (1966). Professor Robertson, however, in discussing the Butts and Walker decisions seems to ignore the possibility that one may be a public figure on the basis of position alone. See Robertson, supra
note 21, at 221.
34 388 U.S. at 155.
35 Id. Under Justice Harlan's view, such plaintiffs could recover damages if they
were able to prove "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure
from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible
publishers," provided that the content of the defamatory statement was such that a publisher would likely know that the plaintiff's reputation would be injured if the statement were published. Id.
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A majority of the Court, however, accepted the rationale expressed in Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion. The late Chief
Justice defined a public figure as one who, although not in public
office, is "nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions," or an individual who molds "events in areas of
concern to society at large" merely because he is famous. 3 6 Since
they could find "no basis in law, logic, or First Amendment policy"
for differentiating between public officials and public figures, a majority of the Court held that the New York Times actual-malice standard
37
should apply to both categories.
While Butts and Walker mark the first time the Court extended
the qualified constitutional privilege set out in New York Times to
defamation suits involving public figures, it had earlier that term applied the actual-malice standard to an invasion of privacy action
brought by a purely private individual in Time, Inc. v. Hill. 38 The
Court's reasoning in that case had been that a review of a play based
on an actual historical event was a matter of public interest. 39 In
36 Id. at 164.
37 Id. at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring). Even though the result in these cases was
announced by Justice Harlan, his rationale was not controlling, as only Justices Clark,
Stewart, and Fortas joined in his opinion. Chief Justice Warren concurred in the result,
but he argued for the application of the Times standard to defamation suits involving
public figures. Although they were unable to accept the late Chief Justice's concurring
opinion in toto, Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and White agreed that the Times
standard should be applied to public figures. Thus, the late Chief Justice's concurrence
constituted the majority position of the Court as to the standard of proof to be required
in similar libel suits. For a discussion of this somewhat confusing opinion see Kalven,
supra note 31, at 275-78.
The Chief Justice rejected Justice Harlan's gross-negligence standard because he
felt that it was "an unusual and uncertain formulation" which would neither provide
adequate guidance to a lay jury nor provide for "the protection for speech and debate
that is fundamental to . . . society and guaranteed by the First Amendment." 388 U.S. at
163 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
The illogic that the late Chief Justice found in making a distinction between public
officials and public figures was based on five factors: 1) Modern technological society
had blurred the distinction between governmental and non-governmental functions; 2)
Public figures frequently "play an influential role in ordering society;" 3) Both public
officials and public figures have reasonably ready access to the media; 4) Inasmuch as
public figures are not answerable to the populace by means of standing for election to
office, public opinion-as expressed through publication of criticism of their actions-is
possibly the only way in which "society can attempt to influence their conduct"; and 5)
The New York Times standard "balances to a proper degree the legitimate interests
traditionally protected by the law of defamation." Id. at 163-64.
38 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
39 Id. at 388. The Hill family had been held hostage by three escaped convicts. To
avoid publicity, the Hills moved to a different state. Some years later a Broadway play
based loosely on the Hill family's experiences was reviewed in Life magazine. The
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addition, lower courts had anticipated the Butts extension of the
actual-malice standard by applying the New York Times rule in a variety of cases which arguably did not fall within the Times Court's
40
public official limitation.
"The inevitable consequence of Time, Inc. v. Hill"4 1 occurred in
review stated that the play was a "re-enactment" of what had happened to the Hills,
when in fact the play was an inaccurate description of those events. See id. at 377-79.
Hill brought suit under a New York state right-of-privacy statute and was awarded damages. This damage award was affirmed by the New York court of appeals. Hill v. Hayes,
15 N.Y.2d 986, 207 N.E.2d 604, 260 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1965), aff'g mem. 18 App. Div. 2d 485,
240 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1st Dep't 1963). See also Hill v. Hayes, 13 App. Div. 2d 954, 216
N.Y.S.2d 497 (1st Dep't 1961), aff'g mem. 207 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. N.Y.
County 1960 (denying motion for summary judgment). The United States Supreme
Court reversed, 385 U.S. at 398, holding that the negligence standard permitted under
the New York statute was insufficient protection for the press and that the actual-malice
test was to be applied to litigation involving "false reports of matters of public interest."
Id. at 387-88.
40 See, e.g., Walker v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co., 246 F. Supp. 231,
234 (W.D. Ky. 1965) (Times standard applied to separate libel action arising out of same
circumstances as those in Walker); Gilberg v. Goffi, 21 App. Div. 2d 517, 526, 251
N.Y.S.2d 823, 832 (1964) (law partner of public official running for re-election must
prove actual malice in defamatory statements made regarding law firm). See also
Comment, The Expanding Constitutional Protection for the News Media from Liability
for Defamation: Predictabilityand the New Synthesis, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1547, 1549-50
n.28 (1972) (citing additional decisions). But see Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335
F.2d 659, 671 (2d Cir. 1964) (Times standard not applicable to defamatory statements
published regarding plaintiff-scientist who was a "participant in public debate on an
issue of grave public concern"); Dempsey v. Time Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 754, 756-57, 252
N.Y.S. 2d 186, 189 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. N.Y. County 1964) (public figure determination
cannot be based upon an event that took place 45 years prior to publication date, as this
does not fall "within the purview of even the suggested extension of the New York
Times case"); Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219, 223-24, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529,
535 (Sup. Ct. Spec. & Trial T. N.Y. County 1964) (Times standard is specifically to be
limited to public officials).
In Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., supra, Judge Friendly made the observation that
"the public official is the strongest case for the constitutional compulsion of such a
privilege" but that he doubted that limitation of the privilege to defamatory statements
about public officials would be possible. Indeed, he expected that it would soon be
extended to candidates for public office, and then "the participant in public debate on
an issue of grave public concern would be next in line." Id. at 671. On the extension of
the Times standard to public figures see generally EMERSON, supra note 22, at 526-28;
Eaton, supra note 21, at 1390-93; Kalven, supra note 31, at 291-309; The Supreme
Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 160-66 (1967); 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 151,
154 n.20 (1971); Note, Fair Comment and FairMistake-Extension of the Sullivan Precedent to Other Matters of Public Interest, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 346, 350-53 (1965).
41 The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 225 (1971) (footnote
omitted). The authors suggest that once the Court had extended the Times privilege to a
publisher involved in an invasion of privacy suit because the report concerned an event
of public interest, an inexorable impetus was supplied to adoption of a "public interest"
standard in defamation cases, because "it would have been anomalous to protect a defendant against liability for invasion of privacy . . . but not against liability for defamation" by means of a public-interest privilege. Id. (footnote omitted).
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1971 when the Butts public-figure standard gave way to a "public
interest" standard. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 4 2 a plurality of
the Court, through an opinion by Justice Brennan, announced that
the actual-malice test was applicable to defamation actions where "the
utterance involved concerns an issue of public or general concern,"
43
regardless of the plaintiff's status in society.
In Rosenbloom, a radio station, in its early broadcasts concerning
the arrest of the plaintiff during a crack-down on pornography, reported that a police official believed that Rosenbloom was " 'a main
distributor of obscene material.' "44 Rosenbloom sued the owners of
the radio station for defamation and contended that since he was
neither a public official nor a public figure he need, under Pennsylvania law, only prove negligence on the part of the defendant in the
This extension of the New York Times standard to reports of events of public interest had been anticipated by a number of commentators. Professor Emerson, for example, questioned the rationality of a position which granted less first amendment protection "to statements made in discussion of public issues generally than to statements
made concerning public officials." EMERSON, supra note 22, at 532. He pointed out that
there was no
dispute . . . that the function of the First Amendment is to protect all communication dealing with public issues, not just that involving public officials. Indeed
there is little doubt that, for purposes of decision making, what goes on in the
nongovernment sector is as important as what takes place in the government
sector. . . . On the basis of all the factors underlying the actual malice rule as
applied to public officials . . . the system of free expression would suffer serious
damage if speakers were not given the same protection in discussing all kinds
of public issues.
Id. at 532-33 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 540-43; Kalven, supra note 21, at 221;
Kalven, supra note 31; Notes, supra note 29; Note, The Scope of First Amendment
Protectionfor Good-Faith Defamatory Error, 75 YALE L.J. 642, 644-45 (1966). Judicial
decisions also reflected this tendency toward adoption of a public interest standard. See
pre-Rosenbloom cases cited in Comment, supra note 40, at 1560-62 & nn.94-96.
42

403 U.S. 29 (1971).

Id. at 44. Justice Brennan, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Blackmun composed
the plurality; Justices Black and White each filed separate concurring opinions; Justice
Harlan dissented; and Justice Marshall filed a dissent in which Justice Stewart joined.
Mr. Justice Douglas did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case. Id.
at 30.
4Id.
at 33. George Rosenbloom was a distributor of nudist magazines to news
dealers in and around Philadelphia. Id. at 32. In October of 1963, as the police were
making an arrest of a news dealer on charges of selling obscene materials, Rosenbloom
arrived to make a delivery and was arrested. Three days later the police, under warrant,
searched Rosenbloom's home and seized his inventory. Rosenbloom, who had been released on bail, surrendered to the police and was rearrested. Id. at 32-33.
A police captain informed the radio station of the arrest and the station broadcast a
news report which contained the defamatory characterization referred to in the text. Id.
at 33. In later newscasts the reference to "obscene material" was amended to read " 'reportedly obscene.' " Id. at 34. After his acquittal on the obscenity charges, Rosenbloom
brought a libel suit against Metromedia, the owner of the station. Id. at 36.
43
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preparation of the newscasts. 45 A plurality of the Court disagreed,
concluding that the "public figure"-"private individual" distinction
was no longer a viable standard by which to assess constitutional
privilege. 4 6 According to Justice Brennan, the public-private distinction simply had no basis "in terms of the First Amendment
guarantees." 4 7 Rather, the proper basis for the constitutional privilege
derives from an evaluation of the event-not the person-involved,
i.e., whether the defamatory report "concerns a matter of public or
48
general interest."
The plurality found the argument that public figures enjoy wide
media access which enables them to respond to defamatory falsehoods
to be an "unproved, and highly improbable, generalization," the
truth of which depended in large measure on the continuing interest
of the media in the
story-an eventuality which the plurality labelled
"unpredictable." 4 9 Justice Brennan, as a result, found the media access argument "too insubstantial a reed on which to rest a constitutional distinction."-50 Secondly, the plurality dismissed the thesis that
one might "assum[e] the risk of defamation by voluntarily thrusting
45 Id. at 40-41. Rosenbloom prevailed at trial where he apparently established a
lack of " 'reasonable care and diligence' " on the part of Metromedia in the preparation
of the offending newscasts. Id. at 38-40 (quoting from Purcell v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 411 Pa. 167, 179, 191 A.2d 662, 668 (1963)). The Third Circuit reversed.
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892, 898 (3d Cir. 1969). The court held that
in the present factual context the proper accommodation between the First
Amendment protections and the state law of defamation is found by requiring a
plaintiff to meet the standard of proof formulated in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan ....
Id. at 896.
46 403 U.S. at 44. The plurality catalogued its prior defamation and invasion of privacy decisions from the more recent Time, Inc. v. Hill back through New York Times,
pointing out that in each instance the first amendment consideration had been coupled
with a concomitant public-interest rationale. Id. at 41-44. In addition, Justice Brennan
intimated that a first amendment public-interest doctrine had been recognized as early
as 1940 when the Court had stated that " '[f]reedom of discussion . . . must embrace all
issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable . . . society to cope
with the exigencies' " that it faces. Id. at 41 (quoting from Thomhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (emphasis added)).
47 403 U.S. at 45-46 (footnote omitted). The plurality noted that the New York Times
standard was designed to promote vigorous debate on public issues, but was not the
result of any determination that the public official in any way differs from the private
person in his interest in protecting his reputation. Id.
48 Id. at 44. Justice Brennan pointed out that the general thrust in defamation law in
the United States had been toward acceptance of a public-interest standard. Id. See
notes 41 & 46 supra; Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858, 861 & n.4 (5th
Cir. 1970) (citing cases).
49 403 U.S. at 46-47.
50 Id. at 47.
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himself into the public eye" on the ground that such a concept has no
basis in the underlying premises of the first amendment. 51 The perpetuation of the public figure "legal fiction," in Justice Brennan's
view, "could easily produce the paradoxical result" of allowing defamatory statements to be published about a public figure's private
life-even though society at large has no legitimate interest in the
events reported-while at the same time "dampening discussion of
issues of public or general concern because they happen to involve
52
private citizens. "
Id. One commentator has remarked that
[e]ach person as a concomitant of living in society takes the risk of exposing
himself to others in varying degrees. . ..
[Wihatever the strength of this assumption of risk argument, one should not l6se sight of the most fundamental
consideration: the discussion of public issues should not be hampered simply
because the issue involves a private citizen.
Comment, supra note 40, at 1568 (footnote omitted).
52 403 U.S. at 48. Justice Brennan based the determination that the public-figure
concept was a legal fiction on the fact that the structure of modern life makes everyone
a "public" person in some way. Id. "Conversely, some aspects of the lives of even the
most public men fall outside the area of matters of public or general concern." Id. (footnote omitted). Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For a similar view see
Comment, supra note 40, at 1567-69.
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Rosenbloom seems to be strongly rooted in
the constitutional philosophy of the late Alexander Meiklejohn. For an extensive presentation of Professor Meiklejohn's philosophy see A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960); A. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT.
REV. 245; D. Meiklejohn, Public Speech and the First Amendment, 55 GEO. L.J. 234
(1966). Justice Brennan himself has discussed Professor Meiklejohn's philosophy. See
Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1965). Dr. Bloustein has argued, however, that Justice Brennan misinterpreted the thrust of Professor Meiklejohn's philosophy. Bloustein, The First
Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher,28 RUTGERS
L. REV. 41, 73-77 (1974).
Professor Meiklejohn drew a distinction between the right of the indivdual "to
speak whenever, wherever, however he chooses," and the "need to hear" on the part of
society. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 25, 57 (1960). It is the latter, in his opinion, that is protected absolutely by the first amendment. "The First Amendment . . . is
not the guardian of unregulated talkativeness"; rather, "[w]hat is essential is not that
everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying [is] said." Id. at 26. In discussing the first ten amendments Professor Meiklejohn stated:
They are not a "Bill of Rights" but a "Bill of Powers and Rights." The Second
through the Ninth Amendments limit the powers of the subordinate agencies in
order that due regard shall be paid to the private "rights of the governed." The
First and Tenth Amendments protect the governing "powers" of the people
from abridgement by the agencies which are established as their servants. In
the field of our "rights," each one of us can claim "due process of law." In the
field of our governing "powers," the notion of "due process" is irrelevant.
A. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 254. See
also Note, The Constitutional Law of Defamation and Privacy: Butts and Walker, 53
CORNELL L. REV. 649, 651-58 (1968).
51
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Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, took issue with the plurality opinion because it would require a "case-by-case" determination of liability, and thus would seem to run counter to the intent of New York
53
Times in which "a rule of general application" had been set out. Justice Harlan also disagreed with the extension of the actual-malice
standard to defamation suits involving purely private plaintiffs. 54 He
believed that a public figure did have greater access to the media "to
rebut falsehoods" and, unlike the private plaintiff, the public figure
"may be held to have run the risk of publicly circulated falsehoods concerning [him]. " 55 He therefore concluded that states should be permitted to set their own "standard of care so long as they do not impose
56
liability without fault."
The plurality opinion in Rosenbloom thus marked the broadest
extension of the New York Times actual-malice standard. 5 7 However,
53 403 U.S. at 63. Justice Harlan noted that the Court should apply "generally applicable rules" where possible "in order to preserve a measure of order and predictabilit' in the law." Id. Employment of such general rules, according to Justice Harlan, is
also requisite to achieving a proper balance of the competing interests involved: The
right of the state to protect the reputations of its citizens and the right of the press to
avoid the necessity of self-censorship. See id. at 64-66.
54Id. at 69. The Times standard had originally been limited to public officials and
public figures. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163 (1967) (Warren,
C.J., concurring); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
Justice Harlan expressed the view that there is indeed a difference "between the
public and the private" person. In his view, "true First Amendment concerns" could
best be protected by continuing to apply the actual-malice standard only to public officials and public figures. 403 U.S. at 69 (Harlan, J., dissenting). He would not allow
states to continue to make defamation liability rest on the mere fact that the statement
was false in cases where the plaintiff was a private person; he would require a showing
of a breach of a "reasonable care" standard. Id.
55 403 U.S. at 70.
56 Id. at 64. Although Justice Harlan's conclusion was in Rosenbloom a minority, it
was soon to become the controlling criterion for establishing liability for defamatory
falsehoods involving private persons. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958 (1976);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Justice Marshall, joined in his dissenting opinion by Justice Stewart, strongly argued against the plurality position in that it would require courts to determine what
events are "of legitimate public interest." 403 U.S. at 79. Requiring such determinations
to be made by courts, Justice Marshall wrote, was a dangerous portent for press freedom. He also pointed out that the plurality had failed "to provide guidelines or standards" to assist courts in this determination. Id. See also Kalven, supra note 31, at
283-84. Like Justice Harlan, Justice Marshall argued against the ad hoc requirement of
the plurality position on the ground that such a procedure would lack predictability for
those involved in the litigation. Like Justice Harlan in another respect, Justice Marshall
also expressed the opinion that "[a] generally applicable resolution [was] available" in
this case. 403 U.S. at 81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57 For a discussion of the Rosenbloom decision see Eaton, supra note 21, 1394-99;
Keeton, Some Implications of the Constitutional Privilege to Defame, 25 VAND. L. REV.
59 (1972); Comment, supra note 40.
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the failure of the plurality position to attract more than three of the
Justices 58 left defamation law unsettled. A resolution was attempted
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 59 where a new majority comprised of
some of the Rosenbloom dissenters and two of the then recently appointed Justices 60 effectively overruled Rosenbloom, holding that
so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may
define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
61
individual.

In Gertz, the plaintiff, an attorney, had been depicted as a member of a Communist group and an "architect of the 'frame-up' " of a
police officer. In fact, he had merely represented a family in a civil
action against a police officer who had been convicted of the second
degree murder of their son. 6 2 At the defamation trial, the publisher
contended that Gertz, having once served on a city housing committee, was a public official. 63 It was also asserted that Gertz was a
public figure, apparently because he had been involved in civil and
professional groups and had published a number of books and articles on legal subjects. 64 The trial court determined that Gertz was
neither a public official nor a public figure and submitted the case
to the jury under Illinois law, charging that such printed statements
51 See note 43 supra.

59418 U.S. 323 (1974). For a general discussion of this decision see Anderson, Libel
and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEXAS L. REV. 422 (1975); Anderson, A Response to Professor Robertson: The Issue Is Control of Press Power, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 271 (1976);
Beytagh, Privacy and a Free Press: A Contemporary Conflict in Values, 20 N.Y.L.F. 453
(1975); Robertson, supra note 21; The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 41,
139 (1974); Note, Gertz v. Welch: Reviving the Libel Action, 48 TEMPLE L.Q. 450
(1975).
60 Justice Powell wrote the Court's opinion in Gertz. He was joined by Justices
Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun and Rehnquist. 418 U.S. at 324. Justices Marshall and
Stewart had dissented in Rosenbloom, see notes 43 & 56 supra, and Justices Powell and
Rehnquist had been appointed to the Court to replace Justices Harlan and Black,
respectively, see 404 U.S. III, iv & nn.*, 1-3 (1972).
61418 U.S. at 347 (footnote omitted). This was the position advocated by Justice
Harlan in his dissent in Rosenbloom. See notes 54-56 supra and accompanying text.
62 418 U.S. at 326. The magazine was a publication of the John Birch Society and
was distributed nationally to the public. Id. at 325, 327. Gertz brought suit under
Illinois libel law claiming injury to "his reputation as a lawyer and a citizen." Id. at
327.
63 See id. at 351. The publisher alternatively contended that Gertz was "a 'de facto'
public official" because he had attended the coroner's inquest into the boy's death. Id.
It was contended that acceptance of either alternative would have necessitated proof of
actual malice as a prerequisite to recovery by Gertz. Id. at 327-28.
64 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997, 998 (N.D. Ill. 1970), aff'd, 471
F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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constituted libel per se and required no finding of fault for recovery. 6 5
After the jury had returned a verdict in favor of Gertz, the court
entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that
the publication discussed an issue "of public interest." 66 In so doing, the district court had anticipated the plurality decision in Rosen67
bloom.
In rejecting the district court's "public interest" analysis, the
Gertz Court stressed that what was essentially at stake was the striking of a correct balance between the state's interest in ensuring that
defamed citizens are compensated and the interest of the publisher in
maintaining an unfettered press. 68 In the Court's view, such a balance required a rejection of the Rosenbloom public-interest analysis
and a return to the public figure-private individual approach that had
been developed in Butts. 69 Justice Powell's rationale for the return to
the public-figure analysis was twofold. First, use of a public-interest
rationale would lead to ad hoc decisions on the part of the Court,
resulting in uncertainty and "render[ing the Court's] duty to supervise the lower courts unmanageable."- 70 Second, he believed that the
Rosenbloom analysis did not provide adequate protection for either of
the two competing interests involved in defamation litigation. A
plaintiff involved in an event of public interest would be forced to
surmount "the rigorous requirements" of the actual-malice standard.
If the event were deemed not to be of the requisite public interest,
the press, no longer protected by the Constitution, would be subject
65 Id. For a discussion of the concept of libel per se see note 18 supra.

66 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997, 1000 (N.D. Ill. 1970), aff'd, 471
F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972), reu'd, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The court noted that
[t]he penumbra of material protected by the guarantee of freedom of speech has
been extended to include matters of public interest, whether or not public officials or public figures are involved.
322 F. Supp. at 999. In support of this position, the trial court cited a number of judicial
decisions which had held that events of public interest were within the protection of
the first amendment. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Wasserman v.
Time, Inc., 424 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 940 (1970) (photograph of a
lawyer lunching with reputed gangsters is of public interest); Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v.
Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970) (deteriorating condition of a hotel serving
guests at a national golf tournament).
67 The motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was granted in 1970 while
the Rosenbloom decision was not announced until 1971.
6s See 418 U.S. at 343.
69 See id. at 343, 345-46.
70 Id. at 343, 346. In addition, the Court questioned the "wisdom" of requiring
judges to make ad hoc decisions as to " 'what information is relevant to self-government.' " Id. at 346 (quoting from Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)).
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to ordinary libel law, which might provide for liability without fault. 71
In reinstating the public-figure analysis, the Gertz Court set forth
criteria by which courts could identify such individuals. Initially, Justice Powell stated that such an identification could be made on the
basis of the "notoriety of... achievements" of the person involved
"or the vigor and success with which [he seeks] the public's
attention." 72 Essentially, a public figure is one who possesses an "especial
prominence in the affairs of society."' 73 Justice Powell emphasized
that public figures generally have come to the forefront of public attention as a result of their own voluntary acts, but he acknowledged
that "[h]ypothetically," some public figures may not have voluntarily
sought public exposure. 74 The Justice went on to indicate that there
were, in fact, two distinct categories of public figure: the "public
figure for all purposes" and the "public figure for a limited range
of issues."75
He indicated that the former is an individual who maintains a
position of "persuasive power and influence." 7 6 In a not entirely consistent manner, he subsequently described such a public figure as
one who has gained "pervasive fame or notoriety." 77 Finally, and
again inconsistently, Justice Powell added a new requirement: A public figure for all purposes must not only enjoy "general fame or notoriety in the community," but he must also be "pervasive[ly]
involve[d] in the affairs of society. '"78 The public figure for a limited
range of issues was defined as one who has interjected himself into or
has been drawn into a public controversy in order to have an impact
on its resolution. 79 Justice Powell concluded that the most "meaning71 418 U.S. at 346.

72Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
73 Id. at 345.
74 Id. Justice Powell seems to have found this eventuality unlikely, however, stating
that "the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare." Id.
75 Id. at 351.
76 Id. at 345.
17Id. at 351. There is more than a subtle difference between "power and influence"
and "general fame or notoriety." While not necessarily mutually exclusive, the two descriptions are not necessarily concomitants. For example, an executive of a large corporation may have a great deal of "power and influence" over the affairs of society, yet be
relatively unknown outside the higher echelons of business or politics. Conversely, a
well-known sports figure may exercise almost no influence over the affairs of society,
and yet his fame is pervasive.
7s Id. at 352. This third characteristic of the public figure seems to be more restrictive than the previous two criteria that Justice Powell set out. Appending the necessity
for "pervasive involvement in the affairs of society" to the previously noted criteria
would apparently severely limit the public-figure category.
79 Id. at 345, 351.
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ful" analysis by which to identify these individuals would be to examine "the nature and extent of [their] participation in the particular
80
controversy giving rise to the defamation."
In applying these tests to the facts of Gertz, the Court indicated
that in order for an individual to be deemed a public figure his fame
or notoriety must extend throughout his community, and not exist
merely within a small social or professional circle. 8 1 Thus, although
Gertz was "well-known in some circles," no proof was offered as to
his fame in the community at large. 8 2 He was therefore deemed not
to be a public figure,8 3 and damages for defamation could be awarded
to him without his having to establish actual malice in the publication
84
of the news story.
Underpinning the Gertz decision and its revival of the publicfigure standard was the media-access rationale which had been so
important to the Butts majority. 85 Applying this rationale to both
categories of public figures, Justice Powell determined that such access is usually "significantly greater" for public officials and public
figures than it is for private individuals. 86 To some degree, however,
the media-access criterion was discounted on the basis that rebuttals
are rarely as effective as the original defamatory statement. 8 7 Nonetheless, the opinion clearly stated that a consideration of media access
was not "irrelevant.-

88

80 Id.

at 352.

81 Id.

at 351-52. One commentator has interpreted the facts of Gertz as implying

that a public figure must be a "household name." Robertson, supra note 21, at 227-29.
Professor Robertson believes that this status could be proved if the jury members are
"generally familiar with the plaintiff" or if public opinion polls should establish the
plaintiff's general fame in the community. Id. at 224 (footnote omitted).
82 418 U.S. at 351-52. In Gertz, the Court apparently gave greater weight to the
absence of any general fame or notoriety on the part of the plaintiff than to his involvement in civil affairs. It will be recalled from Butts, however, that the active involvement
of one in an important public controversy may lead to his attaining public-figure status.
See 388 U.S. at 155. It is difficult to believe that Gertz, having served on a housing
committee and having taken part in the activities of other civic groups, would not have
fallen within this standard. See note 90 infra.
83 418 U.S. at 352. The Gertz Court quickly disposed of the publisher's contention
that Gertz was a public official or a "de facto public official," by stating first that there
was "little basis" for these assertions, and second that prior Supreme Court decisions
had not given the concept of a "de facto public official" any recognition. Id. at 351.
8 Id. at 352.
85 See 388 U.S. at 155.
86 418 U.S. at 344. The Court gave no substantiation for this statement.
87 See id. at 344 n.9.
88Id. The Court indicated that media rebuttal was not, by itself, expected to provide adequate protection for the reputations of public officials and public figures. See
id. at 344 & n.9.
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Gertz left unresolved a number of problems. Although the
characteristics of the public figure for all purposes were defined as
"general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society," 8 9 questions remained as to what would
constitute the community, how pervasive the fame or involvement
had to be, and what interests were to be termed "affairs of society."
Furthermore, in defining a public figure for a limited range of issues,
the Court would seem to require that a plaintiff either act voluntarily
or be "drawn into a particular public controversy"; however, the
Court did not make clear what constitutes a voluntary act, how one
may be drawn into an issue, or even what a public controversy is. 90
Because its decision lacked clarity, the Gertz Court was placed in the
position of having to define its terms on an ad hoc basis. Yet it was
precisely in order to avoid such piecemeal determinations that the
Court in Gertz had rejected the Rosenbloom plurality position. 9 '
s9Id. at 352. However, for an indication that there is a lack of consistency in the
definition of the term see notes 76-78 supra and accompanying text. See also Robertson,
supra note 21, at 223 & n.157.
90 See 418 U.S. at 351-52. This indefiniteness applies to the facts of Gertz to the
same extent it does to post-Gertz decisions. It is easier to understand how the Court
dismissed the argument that Gertz might be a public figure for all purposes than it is to
comprehend the logic behind its dismissal of the contention that he might be a public
figure for a limited range of issues. Certainly Gertz did not possess the national notoriety of either Butts or Walker. On the other hand, in its indecisive definition the Gertz
Court did not require national fame, but required only that the plaintiff have attained
this characteristic in some nebulous community. See 418 U.S. at 352.
At least two commentators have expressed the view that Gertz was, logically, as
much a public figure as either Butts or Walker, inasmuch as
Gertz was a member of numerous boards and commissions in Illinois, had published several books on civil rights matters, had frequently been honored by
civil rights groups and had represented some rather famous clients . . . . His

publishing record belies the notion that he was a poor, helpless, private individual who could not gain access to the press. Gertz was a public figure in
every sense of the term as defined by the Supreme Court in Curtis v. Butts.
The Rosenbloom rule should not have been at issue in the case.
Pember & Teeter, Privacy and the Press Since Time, Inc. v. Hill, 50 WASH. L. REv. 57,
75(1974) (footnote omitted).
However, in Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEXAS L. REv. 422, 449
(1975) the author argued that the extent of Gertz' notoriety distinguished him from Butts
and Walker. Anderson further noted that Gertz should have been deemed a public figure for a limited range of issues:
The shooting [of Nelson] and the subsequent murder indictment were the subject of widespread public debate, and there was no reason to believe that the
civil action by the youth's family would not attract similar attention. By agreeing to represent the family in its suit, it could be said that Gertz voluntarily
injected himself into the controversy.
Id. (footnote omitted).
91See 418 U.S. at 346.
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Time, Inc. v. Firestone92 is itself an example of such an ad hoc determination.

In Firestone, Time proffered two arguments in support of its
proposition that the standard to be applied in determining liability for
the defamatory report was actual malice as defined by the Court in
New York Times. 93 First, Time contended that Mary Alice Firestone
was a public figure. 94 Secondly, Time argued that the news story
92 96 S. Ct. 958 (1976).

93See note 21 supra and accompanying text. See also Recent Developments, New
York Times Standard is Inapplicable to a Defamed Individual Who is Neither a Public
Official Nor a Public Figure; and Only Actual Injury is Compensable Absent Showing
of Actual Malice, 20 VILL. L. REV. 867, 869 n.15 (1975).
94Brief for Petitioner at 31, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Petitioner]. Time pointed out that Mary Alice Firestone had been
" 'drawn into a particular public controversy,' " id. (quoting from Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974)), and that she had also fulfilled the Butts requirement in
that she " 'commanded a substantial amount of independent public interest.' " Brief for
Petitioner, supra at 31 (quoting from Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154
(1967)).
Time also relied on statements made by the Supreme Court of Florida about the
notoriety of the Firestones' marital relationship, to the effect that the Firestones " 'were
well known[,] . . .prominent among the "400" of Palm Beach society, and were also
active members of the sporting set.' " Brief for Petitioner, supra at 31 (quoting from
Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 751 (Fla. 1972)). Time proceeded to stress that
this court had characterized the divorce proceedings as a " 'cause celebre' " and that
Mrs. Firestone had held press conferences " 'and allowed herself to be quoted in relation thereto.' " Brief for Petitioner, supra at 32-33 (quoting from Firestone v. Time, Inc.,
271 So. 2d 745, 751 (Fla. 1972)). Time then attempted to make a bootstrap argument by
adverting to affidavits produced at trial which clearly established that "the divorce proceedings received daily publicity." Brief for Petitioner, supra at 33. In essence, Time
was arguing that the press could make someone a public figure simply by writing about
their affairs.
Time next argued "that the Firestone divorce was a public controversy about which
the press had a duty to report." Brief for Petitioner, supra at 33. Referring to Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion in Butts, Time argued that "[p]ublic controversies involving public figures are not limited to government operations." Id. Again, Time made
its bootstrap argument and contended that because the divorce proceedings had been
the subject of such extended and widespread publicity, Mrs. Firestone was "a central
figure in a public controversy." Id. at 34. This being so, Time maintained, Mary Alice
Firestone would certainly fall within the Gertz criterion for deducing who is to be
deemed a public figure, i.e., one who "'voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a
particular public controversy.'" Id. (quoting from Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 351 (1974)).
Citing McFarland v. Hearst Corp., 332 F. Supp. 746 (D. Md. 1971), and Edmiston v.
Time, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), Time proffered the opinion that
the bringing of a lawsuit involves, in some measure, the decision to put one's
disputes before a public tribunal and thereby forego a degree of anonymity, the
principal "normative consideration" justifying different treatment for public and
private individuals. And defendants in lawsuits are likewise individuals "drawn
into a particular public controversy".
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"was a report of a judicial proceeding," and thus state libel laws
should not be applied. 9 5 Justice Rehnquist rejected both contentions,
initially dispensing with the argument that Mrs. Firestone was a public figure. 96 He cited Gertz for the proposition that a public figure
was one who was extremely influential and powerful or one who by
her own volition brought herself to the center of attention in matters of " 'public controvers[y] in order to influence the resolution of
the issues involved.' "97 Mary Alice Firestone, in Justice Rehnquist's
view, had not "assume[d] any role of especial prominence," nor had
the fact that she had held press conferences for reporters interested
in the divorce proceedings made her a public figure. 98 The opinion
stated that to equate a public controversy such as the Firestone diBrief for Petitioner, supra at 34 (quoting from Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
351 (1974)).
Time also contended that Mrs. Firestone was a public figure because she was married to Russell Firestone. Quoting from Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines and Broadcasting,
Inc., 392 F.2d 417, 419 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840 (1968), Time stated that the
term "public figure" had been defined broadly and included " 'artists, athletes, business
people, dilettantes, anyone who is famous or infamous because of who he is or what he
has done.' " Brief for Petitioner, supra at 35 (emphasis added). Certainly Russell A.
Firestone Jr. fit this description, the argument ran, and therefore when Mary Alice "became embroiled in a public controversy because of her relationship to Russell Firestone
she became a public figure." Id. This designation as a public figure by relationship has

achieved some measure of acceptance. See Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206,
210 (7th Cir. 1976); Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Mrs. Firestone countered these various arguments by positing that 1) deeming her a
public figure on the basis of the notoriety of the divorce proceedings would be an unacceptable return to Rosenbloom which Gertz had forestalled; 2) she could "not be made
a 'public figure' by the newspapers because of publications of her divorce where she
was not a 'public figure' of her own right"; and 3) "[s]he was merely a housewife who
had the misfortune of being married to a wealthy man." Brief of Respondent at 20, 22,
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958 (1976) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter cited as
Brief for Respondent].
95 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 94, at 25-31 (relying on Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)); contra, Brief for Respondent, supra note 94, at
15-17. Although outside the scope of this Note, it should be mentioned that the basis of
this first amendment argument was that the press should enjoy first amendment protection for reports of judicial proceedings because of the necessity for informing the public
of important court proceedings. While such constitutional protection had been acknowledged by the Court for truthful reports in Cox Broadcasting, Time argued that even
false reports of judicial proceedings should be protected by requiring the imposition of
the New York Times standard to defamation suits resulting from such erroneous reports.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 94, at 26-31. See generally Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, supra; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
96 96 S. Ct. at 965.
97 Id. (quoting from Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)).
98 96 S. Ct. at 965-66 & n.3. But see id. at 980-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting); notes
105-09 infra and accompanying text.
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vorce "with all controversies of interest to the public" would be to
resurrect the approach of the Rosenbloom plurality which had been
abandoned by the Court in Gertz. 99 Although conceding that the divorce might attract some public interest, Justice Rehnquist reasoned
that Mrs. Firestone was forced to institute legal proceedings "in
order to obtain . . . release from the bonds of matrimony,"' 10 0 and

that this legal action did not constitute a public controversy within
the meaning of the Gertz decision. 10 1 Moreover, he suggested that
Mrs. Firestone had apparently not sought the publicity that accompanied the divorce proceedings for the purpose of influencing their
disposition. 102
Justice Marshall emphatically dissented. In his view, Mary Alice
Firestone was clearly "a 'public figure' for purposes of reports on the
judicial proceedings she initiated."' 1 3 Not only had she established
herself as a prominent figure prior to the divorce proceedings by associating with the Palm Beach " 'sporting set' ,"104 but she had also
instituted a series of press conferences during the proceedings and
had subscribed to a press clipping service. 10 5 Furthermore, she was
in a firm position to institute what the Gertz Court had termed selfhelp measures; 10 6 that is, her access to the local communications
99 96 S. Ct. at 965.
100Id. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).

101 96 S. Ct. at 965.
102 Id. at 965 n.3. In this rather cryptic footnote, Justice Rehnquist dismissed rather
summarily the importance of the fact that Mrs. Firestone had held a number of press
conferences during the divorce proceedings. He wrote that
there is no indication that she sought to use the press conferences as a vehicle
by which to thrust herself to the forefront of some unrelated controversy in
order to influence its resolution.
Id. (emphasis added). In support of this statement Justice Rehnquist cited Gertz; however, the Gertz language identified as public figures those who "thrust themselves to
the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the
issues involved," not to influence the resolution of some "unrelated controversy." Compare id. with 418 U.S. at 345.
The meaning and application of Justice Rehnquist's statement is unclear. There
would seem to be no reason for determining one's status as a public figure or a private
individual on the basis of one's use of the media to influence the outcome of some
totally unrelated controversy.
103 96 S. Ct. at 980 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104 Id. (quoting from Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 751 (Fla. 1972)).
10596 S. Ct. at 980 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
106 Id. In discussing the media-access remedy in Gertz, Justice Powell had pointed
out that "[the first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help" by using the means
available "to contradict the lie or correct the error," thus reducing the adverse effect on
one's reputation. 418 U.S. at 344. Gertz had relied heavily on the media-access argument
to underpin its rejection of the Rosenbloom plurality position and return to the public
figure-private individual analysis: "Public . . . figures usually enjoy significantly greater
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media enabled her to correct the false statements levelled against
her. 10 7 Acknowledging that her access to the national news media
might not be as extensive, Justice Marshall nonetheless concluded
that the Gertz self-help rationale never contemplated that the selfhelp remedy be fully effective, 10 8 particularly when access to local
media enabled the person defamed to communicate her views to the
local residents-"presumably the audience Mrs. Firestone would
have been most interested in reaching."' 1 9 Furthermore, Justice
Marshall did not read Gertz as requiring that one purposefully seek
public attention in order to be deemed a public figure. 110 Even if her
activities could not clearly be categorized as indicating Mrs. Firestone's voluntary assumption of the risk of defamation, they were
enough to warrant such an assumption on the part of the press."'
Justice Marshall also criticized the majority for having analyzed,
in part, the public-figure issue in terms of whether the Firestone
2
divorce proceedings fell within the meaning of public controversy."1
access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy." Id.
(footnote omitted).
107 96 S. Ct. at 980 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall observed that Mrs.
Firestone had evidently been featured in numerous articles about the divorce in the
local press, and had held "several press conferences." He thus concluded that she was
"hardly in a position to suggest that she lacked access to the media for purposes relating
to her lawsuit." Id.
108Id. It was stated that "Gertz set no absolute requirement that an individual be
able fully to counter falsehoods through self-help in order to be a public figure." Id. For
the Gertz position on the effectiveness of media access see 418 U.S. at 344 n.9.
10996 S. Ct. at 980 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall read Gertz as viewing
self-help to be merely "a minor consideration in determining whether an individual is a
public figure," claiming that it is certainly not to be construed as determinative in itself.
Id. But see 418 U.S. at 344-45 & n.9, where it would appear that the Gertz Court was
doing somewhat more than relegating the self-help argument to a "minor consideration."
110 See 96 S. Ct. at 980-81. In any event, Justice Marshall proceeded to show how
Mrs. Firestone had, in fact, actively participated in events which resulted in her becoming a public figure within the reasoning of Gertz. She had, it was pointed out, voluntarily chosen to join the " 'sporting set,' " knowing full well of the attendant publicity; she
had subscribed to the press-clipping service-an indication "that she was not altogether
uninterested in the publicity she received"; she had chosen, fully aware of her position
in society as one upon whom the media focused their attention, to go into court to seek
separate maintenance. Id. at 980-81. Justice Marshall drew the conclusion from these
premises that "Mrs. Firestone would appear to be a public figure under Gertz." Id.
at 981.
"I Id. at 981 (quoting from Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)).
112 96 S. Ct. at 981. Justice Marshall stated that the majority, in order to avoid the
logical conclusion that Mrs. Firestone was a public figure, had focused on "the subject
matter of the . . . defamation," and had found that the divorce "was not a 'public controversy' as that term [had been] used in Gertz." Id.
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He compared this analysis with that employed by the Rosenbloom
plurality, which had based the applicability of the New York Times
actual-malice test on a finding that the matter was "of 'public or general concern.' -113 In other words, the Firestone majority's determination that Mrs. Firestone was not a public figure because the divorce
proceedings could not be deemed a public controversy under Gertz,
represented a return to the Rosenbloom rationale that the event,
rather than the person's status, is the determining factor in a finding
1 14
of liability for defamation.
Since Mary Alice Firestone would seem to be a public figure for
a limited range of issues as defined by the Gertz majority, 1 1 5 Justice
Marshall's analysis appears to be correct. 1 1 6 The majority's failure to
come to the same conclusion suggests that the Court has read the
rather vague public-figure criteria propounded in both Gertz and
Butts in a different light. For example, Justice Marshall believed that
Mrs. Firestone's association with the " 'sporting set' " of Palm Beach
society indicated that she was well-known in the community. 11 7 The
majority, however, in concluding that she "did not assume any role of
especial prominence in the affairs of society, other than perhaps Palm
Beach society," 1 18 suggests that "community" may encompass more
than the immediate locality. This position seems inconsistent with
Gertz, where the majority implied that "community" could mean the
city or town in which the plaintiff resided. 119
113 Id.
114 Id. See 418 U.S. at 346-47. According to Justice Marshall:

If Gertz is to have any meaning at all, the focus of analysis must be on the
actions of the individual, and the degree of public attention that had already
developed, or that could have been anticipated, before the report in question.
96 S. Ct. at 982 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
115 See text accompanying notes 75, 79-80 supra.
116 Applying these criteria to Mary Alice Firestone, it would seem that she fell
within these defined limits. She did, as Mr. Justice Marshall pointed out, voluntarily
enter the social elite of Palm Beach with an awareness of the likelihood of attendant
publicity. 96 S. Ct. at 981. She not only expected this publicity, but she also apparently
fostered it by granting press conferences during the divorce proceedings. She knew that
there would be a good deal of publicity given to her law suit for separate maintenance,
and if one examines her role in the divorce proceedings-which were shown to be
widely covered in the press-it will be seen that she played a major part in them. See id.
117 See 96 S. Ct. at 981.
11s Id. at 965.
119 418 U.S. at 351-52. The term "community" was not specifically defined in
Gertz. In fact, the Gertz Court itself seems to have used the term in two different
senses. In examining Gertz' position in the "community," the Court referred to the fact
that he had "long been active in community . . . affairs" and noted his membership in
"local civic groups." Id. at 351. The Court went on to draw the conclusion that Gertz
was not a public figure, however, because he was not generally known "in the commu-
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The Firestone majority and Justice Marshall also disagreed as to
the meaning of "voluntary" as it relates to an evaluation of the ac20
tivities that brought the defamation plaintiff into the controversy.
The majority opinion indicates that acts stemming from exigency or
legal compulsion are not "voluntary." Mary Alice Firestone's instituting separate maintenance proceedings, for example, was not construed as the kind of voluntary act which warranted the conclusion
that she had "thrust herself to the forefront of [a] particular public
controversy" so as to be deemed a public figure. 12 1 Although this
nity" and it was pointed out that none of the members of the jury panel "had ever heard
of [him]." Id. at 351-52. While there seems to be some apparent inconsistency in this, it
would appear that the Gertz Court was employing "community" to mean the local geographical area, perhaps Cook County or the city of Chicago. There is no indication that
the Court here envisaged a statewide or national community.
The Firestone Court, however, seems to have shifted its interpretation of the clear
implication of Gertz' community limitations. By intimating that it did not accept Mrs.
Firestone's prominence in the Palm Beach community to be dispositive of the issue, the
Court implied that "community" must extend beyond the immediate locality. The Firestone Court, however, made no statement which would provide any guidance to future
courts in making a public figure determination.
It could be argued that because Time magazine was an international publication
and had publicized the allegedly defamatory report internationally (or at least nationally), "community" should be read to mean either the entire United States or the world,
since "community" could logically be read to mean that area in which the defamation
had been spread.
However, the publication in Gertz had also been distributed nationally, yet the
Court in that case had made no indication that it viewed "community" to mean anything but the immediate locality. That the Firestone Court should dismiss Mrs.
Firestone's fame in Palm Beach and its environs seems an important redefinition of the
Gertz Court's concept of "community."
120Compare 96 S. Ct. at 965 with id. at 980-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121 Id.
at 965. Although Mrs. Firestone had not sought a divorce, but rather separate
maintenance, the Firestone majority analogized her being "compelled to go to court by
the State in order to obtain legal release from the bonds of matrimony," id., to the
situation in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), wherein the Court had stated
that
[riesort to the judicial process by these plaintiffs is no more voluntary in a
realistic sense than that of the defendant called upon to defend his interests in
court. For both groups this process is not only the paramount disputesettlement technique, but, in fact, the only available one.
Id. at 376-77.
The Firestone majority seems to have misread the wording of the divorce judgment
here. This order points out that the original action was initiated "upon plaintiff wife's
second amended complaint for separate maintenance. . .. ' Firestone v. Firestone, No.
64 C 2790 C at 1 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Dec. 15, 1967) (emphasis added). The judge in the
divorce proceedings also alluded to the fact that "[p]laintiff strongly resists her
husband's claim for divorce .... " Id. at 3. It must also be borne in mind that Mrs.
Firestone appealed the original grant of divorce all the way to the Florida supreme
court. See Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223, 225 (Fla. 1972), aff'g in part Firestone
v. Firestone, 249 So. 2d 719 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), aff'g Firestone v. Firestone, No.
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activity was not voluntary and hence did not fall within the purview
of the Gertz voluntary-involvement standard, the fact that Mrs. Firestone was compelled by exigency to institute separation proceedings
would seem to lead to the conclusion that she nonetheless was a public figure, in that she had been-in Gertz terms-"drawn into" the
controversy.' 2 2 The failure of the Firestone majority to reach this
conclusion, however, would seem to lead to one of two inferences:
either the involuntary involvement in a public controversy is no
longer a viable criterion for designating one a public figure, or else
the extent to which or the method by which one is "drawn into" a
public controversy in order to become a public figure is limited to
extremely narrow circumstances which the Court has left yet undefined.
The Firestone decision also signals both a de-emphasis and, at
the same time, a noticeable shift in the Court's application of the
media-access criterion. The Court never evaluated Mrs. Firestone's
wide access to the news media in any positive sense. 12 3 Rather, the
majority introduced two new questions into the media-access analysis:
first, whether in fact a defamation plaintiff uses the media to his
advantage12 4 and second, whether a plaintiff uses the media to in1 25
fluence the resolution of a completely "unreiated controversy.'
Neither of these questions seems particularly relevant to a mediaaccess evaluation. Traditionally, the analysis focused on access, not
usage.' 2 6 Thus, the courts would look to whether or not the particu64 C 2790 C (Fla. Cir. Ct., Dec. 15, 1967). It may therefore be contended that Mrs. Firestone was not seeking "to obtain legal release from the bonds of matrimony," 96 S. Ct.
at 965, as Justice Rehnquist stated.
122 If, as the Court indicated, she did not voluntarily inject herself into a public
controversy and the divorce proceedings were a matter of public interest, as the resulting publicity would seem to indicate, then Mary Alice Firestone could logically be
deemed a public figure in that she was "drawn into" a public controversy as required by
Gertz. See 418 U.S. at 351-52.
123See 96 S. Ct. at 965-66. Indeed, the majority acknowledged her ready access to
the media sub silentio by making passing reference to the fact that Mrs. Firestone had
made use of press conferences. See id. at 965 n.3.
124 Id. at 965 n.3. Justice Rehnquist pointed out that "[s]uch interviews should have
had no effect upon the merits of the legal dispute between respondent and her husband
or the outcome of that tri.Al." Id. He then went on to state that he was not of the opinion
that "it can be assumed that any such purpose was intended." Id. Thus, if a plaintiff
should use the media to affect the outcome of a legal dispute he might be considered a
public figure; if he does not, even though he has access to the media, he is not.
125 Id. See note 102 supra.
126 Mr. Justice Marshall raised the point that
Gertz did not intend to establish a requirement that an individual attempt to
influence the resolution of a particular controversy before he can be termed a
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lar defamation plaintiff had an available remedy by which to counteract the effects of the defamatory falsehood. 1 27 Whether in fact the
plaintiff had ever exploited the potential remedy was never material
to the analysis. 128 Additionally, the Firestone Court's examination of
the use of media in an "unrelated controversy" would seem to contradict Gertz' mandate that the court focus on "the particular con1 29
troversy giving rise to the defamation.'
These distortions of the media-access scrutiny are not, however,
the most serious problem in the Firestone decision. Firestone is internally inconsistent as well as inconsistent with Gertz. Although the
opinion disavows the "public interest" rationale of Rosenbloom, the
distinction made between public controversies and "controversies of
interest to the public"'130 is, as Justice Marshall forcefully pointed
out,' 3 1 grounded on this rationale. Furthermore, the majority position re-establishes the need to make ad hoc distinctions-a position
criticized in both Gertz and Firestone itself. 13 2 Clearly, the Court's
public figure. If that were the rule, Athletic Director Butts in Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts . . .would not be a public figure. We held that Butts was a public
figure, and in Gertz we specifically noted that that decision was "correct."
96 S. Ct. at 982 n.2 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
127 See 418 U.S. at 344; 388 U.S. at 155.
128 See note 126 supra. Indeed, effective use of the media would seem to have little
constitutional relevance to a determination of a person's status. The concept underlying
the public figure-private individual determination is that the public figure "enjoy[s]
significantly greater access" to the media, not that he uses his access more effectively.
See 418 U.S. at 352.
129Compare 96 S.Ct. at 965 n.3 with 418 U.S. at 352. See also note 102 supra.
130 96 S. Ct. at 965 (majority opinion). Time had argued that because the Firestone
divorce was a cause c4lbre and was attended by a great deal of publicity, it must be
deemed a public controversy. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 94, at 32-33. This argument had been rejected by the Florida supreme court, Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So.
2d 745, 752 (1972), and by the United States Supreme Court, 96 S. Ct. at 965. The
Florida court stated that the divorce proceedings were not "matters of real public or
general concern." Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 752 (Fla. 1972), rev'd on
other grounds, 96 S. Ct. 958 (1976). The Supreme Court refused to accept Time's equation of public controversy, as employed by the Gertz Court, with "all controversies of
interest to the public." 96 S.Ct. at 965.
131 See 96 S. Ct. at 981-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also notes 112-14 supra and
accompanying text.
132 96 S. Ct. at 981 (Marshall, J.,dissenting). Neither the Firestone
nor the Gertz
Court set out any determinative criteria or "rule of general application" to guide lower
courts in making this determination. Lacking any specificity in terms, there can be no
alternative but for the Court to continue reviewing lower court decisions until some
consistent standards evolve which will permit lower courts to make decisions as to what
constitutes legitimate public controversies. This, of course, is a Rosenbloom approach
which Gertz and Firestone expressly abjure. See 403 U.S. at 44-45 & n.12. But see 418
U.S. at 346; 96 S. Ct. at 965 & 981-82 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
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attempt to lend standards to the task of identifying public figures and
to use the public-figure analysis to avoid a multiplicity of ad hoc decisions which "render [its] duty to supervise the lower courts unman133
ageable" has not been successful.
Perhaps the Court should acknowledge that any constitutional
standard employed in defamation actions will require ad hoc decisions
to be made in determining which plaintiffs warrant greater protection
from defamatory falsehoods. This would seem to be true whether a
public-figure determination or a public-interest test is used. If this is
so, then it seems better reasoned to protect reports because they
concern events of public interest than to found such protection on a
person's status in society. 134 Rather than creating a greater threat to

freedom of the press, as Justice Marshall feared, 13 5 a return to the
public-interest approach would likely give the news media broader
protection, in that the range of issues that are not of legitimate public
interest seems extremely narrow.' 3 6 Under this approach, for example, the Firestone case might have been decided the same way, because most divorce proceedings are probably not of the requisite
133

This statement was originally made- in Gertz. 418 U.S. at 343. In the ensuing

period, however, defamation suits have continued to reach the Court, and Firestone
itself is an example of the effects of the lack of clarity emanating from Gertz.
134 The policy underlying passage of the first amendment was that the people must
be able to discuss and debate openly issues necessary for society to function effectively.
If one accepts that premise, then the Rosenbloom plurality position seems to be based
on more solid ground constitutionally than the public figure-private individual dichotomy. See generally EMERSON, supra note 22, at 517-43; Comment, supra note 40.
135 Cf. 403 U.S. at 84 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall had opposed the
public-interest test as it had been set out by the Rosenbloom plurality largely because it
would require courts to make ad hoc decisions and result in a lack of "predictability and
certainty" as to what events would be adjudged to be in the public interest. Id. at 81.
Although he opposed acceptance of the Rosenbloom standard, he expressed the opinion
that a measure of the self-censorship which he envisaged as resulting from Rosenbloom
could be avoided by eliminating the possibility of punitive damages being awarded. See
id. at 84.
136 See Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and the First Amendment, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 788 n.62 (1975). For
cases holding what might be considered events of minor importance to be public issues
under Rosenbloom see e.g., Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir.
1970) (condition of accommodations at a hotel during a national golf tournament); Hensley v. Life Magazine, Time, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (issuance of ministerial ordination credentials by Universal Life Church); Sellers v. Time Inc., 299 F. Supp.
582 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd, 423 F.2d 887 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 830 (1970) (law
suit arising out of a stray golf shot); Washington v. New York News, Inc., 37 App. Div.
2d 557, 322 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1971) (bishop's attendance at a night club performance by a
choir singer from his church); Twenty-Five East 40th St. Restaurant Corp. v. Forbes,
Inc., 37 App. Div. 2d 546, 322 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1971) (quality of food served in a restaurant).
The obvious inference of these decisions is that there is little that falls outside the
limits of"legitimate public interest." See also Comment, supra note 40, at 1560-61 n.94.
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public interest; 137 thus, the actual-malice standard would be inapplicable.' 38 Yet the interests of the defamation plaintiff who is not a
public official need not be sacrificed to this broader news media protection. Where the event which initiated the defamatory report is
deemed to be of sufficient public concern, the proper balance of interests could be achieved by applying a gross negligence standard
rather than either a simple negligence or the Times actual-malice
standard. 139
Eventually, a broader body of case law would establish clearer
precedent as to what issues are, in fact, of public interest. Thus, it is
likely that fewer cases falling within defined limits would be appealed
unless the litigant felt that the lower court had misinterpreted the
established precedents. Eventually, there would be a reduction of the
pressure on the Supreme Court to supervise lower-court determinations of defamation issues. While it seems true that use of a publicfigure criterion would also eventually provide a body of case law
establishing limits on the types of person to fall within this category,
it would seem that a public-interest test is better founded on the underlying premises of the first amendment. This amendment was
designed to protect the ways and means available to the people for
debate and discussion of issues affecting a well-ordered society. Ac137 If the divorce proceedings of personalities as well known as the Firestones do
not fall within this category, it is likely that the same would hold true for all but the
most widely known personalities.
138 Under Gertz, Rosenbloom, Walker, Butts, and Times, if the defamatory statement
does not fall within the limited constitutional privilege granted to the press, state libel
laws would obtain. After Gertz, however, states must require that at least a showing of
negligence be made before liability can attach. See 418 U.S. at 347; cf. 388 U.S. at 155.
139 A simple-negligence standard would seem to permit recovery upon too uncertain
a basis. Use of such a standard might have the "chilling effect" of self-censorship on the
part of the press because of the uncertainty as to what a jury would deem to be negligent acts by a publisher. Although use of a negligence standard in any litigation leads to
the same degree of uncertainty, arguably the import to society of a free press seems to
warrant use of a standard that provides for more certainty as to the outcome of litigation.
A gross-negligence standard would seem to obviate this problem to some extent, in
that the jury would have to find, as Justice Harlan expressed it in Butts, "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." 388 U.S. at 155
(emphasis added). Such a standard would seem, on its face, to reduce the likelihood of
increasing numbers of defamation suits, and it would limit recovery to those instances
where some tangible fault could be shown, rather than permit recovery for mere, and
slight, carelessness.
Establishing actual malice, that is, proving that the publisher had "serious doubts as
to the truth of his publication," as mandated by St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,
731 (1968), would seem to require proof of intent. The gross-negligence standard enunciated by Justice Harlan in Butts, however, seems not so formidable a proof requirement. See note 35 supra.
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cepting this as the purpose of the first amendment, it follows logically that use of a public-interest test coupled with a gross negligence
standard would best balance the two competing interests involved:
the right of the state to protect the reputations of its citizens, and the
right of the people to be informed by virtue of the first amendment
guarantee of a free and unfettered press.
Richard L. Schaplowsky

